




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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JUN 23 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ATTENTION: Assistant for Coordination

SUBJECT: Implementation of JSG Recommendations - Current Status

A decision on the reorganization of DOD intelligence is still awaited. Consequently implementation of No. 1 and related recommendations continues in abeyance.

During the period of this report, implementing action was initiated on No. 29 by the assignment of officers from the National Security Agency, the Army, Navy and Air Force to the coordination staff of the Director of Central Intelligence. Action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been delayed in order to give Major General Richard Collins, USA, an opportunity to familiarize himself with details of this arrangement and to approve the selection of a JCS representative. General Collins relieved General Breitweiser as Director of J-2 (Intelligence) during the period of this report.

Toward implementation of No. 6, an ad hoc group of Service and Joint Staff representatives has completed a study of the Special Security Officer (SSO) systems undertaken in response to a request from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). It was found that in no instance did more than one military service SSO serve a particular embassy or other non-DOD agency. The Army provides SSO service on a cost basis to Department of State agencies overseas. It would therefore be expected that if there were duplication, State as the customer would be quick to terminate the service as an unnecessary expense. However, the ad hoc group found no evidence of this. On the contrary, the Department of State gives every evidence of being fully satisfied with the service provided under the arrangement.

The report further pointed out that the SSO system involves more than a simple courier function. The SSO of a command must also provide the commander served with staff advice and execute various actions necessary to protect COMINT from unauthorized disclosure. It is this latter function rather than the comparatively unimportant duties which form the basis of the rank structure of the SSO systems.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

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
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Departmental regulations prohibit an SSO from placing his own interpretation on the COMINT material transmitted by him, stressing that evaluations must be developed in the light of all available intelligence and in cooperation with the intelligence element of the command. As a result of the ad hoc investigation, additional emphasis has been placed on these regulations to insure compliance throughout the system.

The interdepartmental committee studying implementation of No. 39 met on June 16th. It was agreed that matters had progressed to a point where a proposed action could be drafted. Mr. Nordbeck of the Coordination Staff and Colonel Arthur Smith, USAF, of DDR&E will collaborate on the paper which is scheduled for consideration at the next meeting. It was also agreed that No. 39 could not be fully implemented until action was taken on No. 21.



CLYDE W. ELLIOTT
Deputy Assistant to
The Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)

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